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Justice Bertha Wilson:
A Classically Liberal Judge
Kent Roach*

I. INTRODUCTION
Bertha Wilson will be remembered as the first woman to sit on the
Supreme Court. Historians will look to her decisions in R. v. Morgentaler1
and R. v. Lavallee2 as signs that, to paraphrase Justice Wilson’s famous
speech, she really did make a difference as the first woman judge to sit on
the Supreme Court.3 It is undeniable that Justice Wilson made a
difference. It is very likely that Justice Wilson’s gender and her
experiences with discrimination4 shaped her personality and her approach
to judging. Nevertheless, in this essay, I will argue that Justice Wilson’s
approach to judging was most influenced by her classical liberalism that
defended the rights of the individual against the power of the state. Justice
Wilson was a feminist, but first and foremost, she was a liberal.
Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism is evident in her decisions about
criminal justice and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 In
many of these decisions, she sided with the individual over the state. She
expressed a preference for tests that would encompass individuals in all
their idiosyncrasies and would require the state to establish subjective
fault. In some of these cases, Justice Wilson reached decisions that
favoured women, but in others she made decisions that arguably put
women at risk. Justice Wilson was a principled judge in the sense that
she did not tailor her judgments to obtain results that would benefit
*

Professor of Law and Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of
Toronto. I thank Jamie Cameron for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”].
2
[1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”].
3
Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 507.
4
Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), chapters 3, 4 and 7.
5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].

194

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)

certain groups including women. Befitting her experience as a Bay Street
lawyer where sub-clauses and commas can make all the difference, she
carefully engaged with the text and the purposes of the laws that she
interpreted.
In the first part of this essay, I will address the question of what is a
classical liberal. I will focus on Justice Wilson’s judgment in
Morgentaler which, to my mind, epitomizes her philosophical approach.
Although this landmark judgment is influenced by feminism in the sense
that Justice Wilson writes from the perspective of a woman, I will argue
that it is ultimately grounded in classical liberalism. More than any other
judgment, Morgentaler reveals the essence of Justice Wilson’s approach
to judging.
Following the structure of her judgment in Morgentaler, this essay
will then examine how classical liberalism informed Justice Wilson’s
approach to the procedural protections owed to the individual and the
substantive content of the criminal law. Although Justice Wilson
criticized the approach taken by her colleagues in Morgentaler as merely
procedural, Justice Wilson’s own procedural decisions were firmly
grounded in liberal principles. The culmination of her principled and
moralized approach to procedure can be seen in her ringing concurrence
in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews6 where she justified
extending equality protections to the non-enumerated group of noncitizens on the grounds that their right to equal concern and respect was
likely to be neglected and ignored by legislatures. The Andrews
approach to equality also illuminates Justice Wilson’s approach to
criminal law because she was well aware that those accused of crime are
themselves an unpopular group and that other disadvantaged groups
were overrepresented in their numbers.
With respect to the substantive content of the criminal law, Justice
Wilson’s liberal and individualist approach meant that she favoured
wherever possible a subjective approach to fault that took into account all
the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the individual. At the same time,
Justice Wilson was a principled judge who respected clear decisions by
Parliament to employ objective standards to limit the ambit of defences. In
cases such as R. v. Hill7 and Lavallee, she grappled with the difficult
problem of how objective standards should be applied in a contextual
manner that was fair to all.
6
7

[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].
[1986] S.C.J. No. 25, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.).
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Finally, I will examine how Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism
informed her unflinching and rigorous approach to the Oakes8 standard
of justification. Justice Wilson did not share the ambivalence towards the
state that is found in the section 1 jurisprudence of many of her
colleagues, including Chief Justice Dickson and Justices Lamer and La
Forest.9 Her approach was frequently a dissenting one, but it served as a
pole star that helped ensure that the Court never lost sight of the fact that
section 1 of the Charter required the state to justify why it was necessary
to infringe rights. I will argue that this approach to section 1 was
ultimately grounded in liberal principles that stressed the importance of
protecting all individuals from the state.

II. MORGENTALER AND THE CORE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
By a classical liberal, I mean a person who places a premium on
individual freedom and liberty and who holds state incursions on liberty
to strict standards of justification. A liberal can be contrasted with a
communitarian who places a premium on the ability of the state to
articulate its collective values and to protect itself from danger. All
feminists are concerned with the historical and contemporary
disadvantages of women in society, but there can be liberal and less
liberal feminists.10 A liberal feminist would see the individual as the
fundamental building block of society and would have concerns about
injustice to any individual. A less liberal communitarian or radical
feminist would see groups as the fundamental building block of society
and would be more enthusiastic about using state power, including
criminal law, to rectify the disadvantages suffered by groups such as
women. Such a feminist might be less likely to conclude that an
individual has suffered an injustice at the hands of the state if the state
8

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
For an account of the Court at that time, see R.J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson:
A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
10
Liberal and conservative approaches to the criminal law are well known and symbolized
in the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lord Devlin: see H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and
Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1965). Feminists reject classical liberalism or classical conservatism,
but they do differ in their orientation towards the state and their focus on the individual or the group
as most important social actor. Catherine MacKinnon has written that “[l]iberal feminism takes the
individual as the proper unit of analysis and measure of the destructiveness of sexism. For radical
feminism, although the person is kept in view, the touchstone for analysis and outrage is the
collective ‘group called woman’”: Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), at 40.
9
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was acting to ameliorate the disadvantages of a group or to protect
vulnerable groups from harm.
Justice Wilson, with her emphasis on the rights of all individuals and
the rights of the accused, stands at the liberal end of the spectrum while
the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé, stands at the communitarian end with her skepticism
about many rights claims by the accused and her deference towards the
state’s crime control interests. The differences between the two
distinguished jurists are well illustrated in R. v. Martineau,11 where
Justice Wilson agreed with Justice Lamer that the stigma and penalty of
a murder conviction required that the Crown prove the accused knew
that the victim was likely to die. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé argued that negligence was a sufficient fault level even
for murder and that the “concern that these offenders not endure the Mark
of Cain is, in my view, an egregious example of misplaced compassion”. 12
In R. v. Swain,13 Justice Wilson concluded that the accused’s Charter
right to control his or her own defence, as well as the equality rights of
those with mental disorders, would be violated if the Crown was allowed
to argue that the accused was insane and should be detained on that basis
before the accused had been convicted on the merits. Justice L’HeureuxDubé dissented on the basis that the traditional rule that allowed the
Crown to raise the insanity defence before the accused was convicted
was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice which, in her
view, included social protection against dangerous people who were
insane when they committed a crime. The fact that both Justice Wilson
and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé were feminists who equally wished to
counter the historical subordination of women and other disadvantaged
groups should not obscure the deep philosophical differences between
the two jurists.
11

[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martineau”].
For a remarkably candid defence of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s frequent dissents in
criminal law matters, her concerns that the Court’s decisions favoured the individual accused too
much over the collective interests of the community and the discovery of the truth in the criminal
justice system, her sympathy for crime victims and the job of Crown prosecutors and her use of
s. 15 of the Charter as a shield for the crime control activities of the state, see Claire L’HeureuxDubé, “The Charter of Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Canada: Where We
Have Been and Where We Should Go” (2006) 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 473. For a
rebuttal of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s view, see Peter Sankoff, “Generally Speaking Canada is
Going in the Right Direction: A Response to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé” (2006) 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
491.
13
[1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Swain”].
12
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Justice Wilson’s most important decision was likely her concurring
judgment in Morgentaler, which found that Canada’s 1969 law
restricting abortions unless approved by a hospital committee and
performed in a hospital was an unjustified violation of section 7 of the
Charter. Justice Wilson criticized Chief Justice Dickson and Justice
Beetz for stressing the procedural flaws in the legislation that made the
defence to the crime of having or performing an abortion apply in an
arbitrary manner in different parts of Canada. Justice Wilson was
concerned with the merits of the abortion issue and she was not
embarrassed to cite American substantive due process precedents such as
Roe v. Wade14 as support for her view that women should have freedom
of choice at least in the first trimester of her pregnancy. The differences
between Justice Wilson and her colleagues were far from academic. For
example, Justice Wilson’s approach would have likely invalidated a bill
that was defeated by a tied vote in the Senate that would have imposed
criminal regulation on even early abortions.15
The part of Justice Wilson’s judgment that caught headlines and
cemented her reputation as a feminist judge was her statement that “It is
probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively,” to the
dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy “not just because it is outside the
realm of his personal experience (although this is, of course, the case)
but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating
the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the
dilemma.”16 To be sure, this passage reflected the experience of
women,17 but it was not a pro-choice statement as contended by some

14
15

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
F.L. Morton, Morgentaler vs. Borowski (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992),

chapter 23.
16

Morgentaler, supra, note 1, at 171.
Justice Wilson added that
the history of the struggle for human rights from the eighteenth century on has been the
history of men struggling to assert their dignity and common humanity against an
overbearing state apparatus. The more recent struggle for women’s rights has been a struggle
to eliminate discrimination, to achieve a place for women in a man’s world, to develop a set
of legislative reforms in order to place women in the same position as men (pp. 81-82). It
has not been a struggle to define the rights of women in relation to their special place in the
societal structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the two sexes. Thus,
women’s needs and aspirations are only now being translated into protected rights. The right
to reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in this case is one such right and is
properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and
worth as a human being.
Id., at 172 (emphasis in original).
17
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who criticized Justice Wilson as a judicial activist.18 Rather it was a
prelude to Justice Wilson’s conclusion that the abortion law infringed a
woman’s freedom of conscience. One sometimes neglected implication
of this ruling was that it protected a woman’s decision whether or not to
have an abortion. It did not matter to Justice Wilson as a liberal whether
a woman decided to have or not have an abortion, and she respected the
woman’s right to make her own decisions for her own reasons. Although
the abortion issue obviously had a profound affect on women as a group,
it was ultimately for Justice Wilson a matter of individual conscience
and freedom. The context was abortion, but the principle was freedom.19
The liberalism that drove her Morgentaler judgment is best captured
in Justice Wilson’s statement that:
The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the
individual in society. An individual is not a totally independent entity
disconnected from the society in which he or she lives. Neither,
however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in
which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those
of the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The Charter reflects
this reality by leaving a wide range of activities and decisions open to
legitimate government control while at the same time placing limits on
the proper scope of that control. Thus, the rights guaranteed in the
Charter erect around each individual, metaphorically speaking, an
invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The
18
See, for example, Robert Hawkins & Robert Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha
Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1; F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the
Court Party (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000); Robert Bork, Coercing Virtue: The
Worldwide Rule of Judges (Toronto: Vintage, 2002). For my own arguments that these critics of
judicial activism discount the anti-majoritarian role of judicial review, and that they have highly
positivist and unrealistic views of adjudication that conceive of unfettered discretion as the only
alternative to following clear, black-letter law, see Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at chapters 5 and 6.
19
As Justice Wilson eloquently explained:
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom
guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and
their own philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they
will express themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they
will pursue. These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that
the state will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will
avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is founded is the
right to make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state. This right
is a critical component of the right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase
capable of a broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, grants the
individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental personal importance.
Morgentaler, supra, note 1, at 166.
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role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of the
fence.20

Although some commentators have struggled to reconcile this
expression of liberalism with the feminist aspects of the decision, they
need only have looked at Justice Wilson’s decisions on matters of
criminal law and procedure.21 Justice Wilson saw most criminal and
immigration matters22 as ones that involved the state as the sole
antagonist of the individual.23 To borrow from her spatial analogy in
Morgentaler, Justice Wilson undertook the task of constructing the fence
that would protect the individual from the state. As will be seen, section
1 of the Charter provided a means to allow the state to hop over the
fence, but Justice Wilson insisted on a high fence that would require the
state to demonstrate the necessity for incursions on the rights of
individuals.

III. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
One of the foundations of Justice Wilson’s liberalism was her sense
that individuals were protected by rights and that the state had special
obligations to protect and respect the rights of the individual. In 1988,
she decided a case in favour of Janise Marie Gamble, a woman who had
been convicted as an accomplice in the first degree murder of a police
officer in 1976 and had been sentenced to life imprisonment without
20

Id., at 164.
Writing in 1991, Christine Boyle recognized that “the core of the judgment is liberal”,
albeit a “radical liberalism”, that took into account the circumstances of women and took their rights
seriously: Christine Boyle, “The Role of the Judiciary in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson”
(1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 241, at 251-52. Writing at the same time, Danielle Pinard similarly concluded
that “for Justice Wilson, the dignity of the individual is fundamental. It includes the liberty to make
decisions, to live one’s life in accordance with one’s values”: Danielle Pinard, “The Constituents of
Democracy: The Individual in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 81, at 91.
[hereinafter “The Constituents of Democracy”]. See also Philip Bryden, “The Democratic Intellect:
The State in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J. 65, at 90.
22
See, for example, Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985]
S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
23
Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. Note
that Wilson J. generally did not have the ambivalence demonstrated by McLachlin J. when in RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.)
she recognized that the singular antagonist model could be broken down by considering the rights of
victims. But see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Keegstra”], where Wilson J. joined with a majority over a strong dissent by McLachlin J. in
holding that violations of freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence had been
justified under s.1 of the Charter.
21
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eligibility for parole for 25 years. Gamble had committed a robbery with
her husband (who subsequently killed himself with a drug overdose),
another man and another woman. The case could have been seen as one
in which two women were literally taken along for a deadly ride with
dominant and perhaps abusive men,24 but Justice Wilson presented the
case through the lens of procedural fairness and the obligations of the
state to give the individual the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
Gamble was sentenced under new first degree murder provisions that
were introduced when Canada abolished the death penalty. The killing,
however, took place when Gamble could theoretically have been
sentenced to death. The older capital murder provisions were in some
aspects more beneficial to the accused than the newer ones because they
had a maximum of only 20 years ineligibility for parole, and they would
require that Gamble’s own act have caused or assisted in causing the
death of the police officer. Gamble did not shoot the police officer.
Justice Wilson found that Gamble’s rights under section 7 of the Charter
had been violated by the continuing adverse effects of having been
convicted and sentenced under a law not in force at the time the crime
was committed. She granted Gamble’s request for habeas corpus and
declared her eligible for parole. Chief Justice Dickson dissented on the
basis that the Charter could not be applied retroactively to a 1976
conviction and on the basis that Gamble had not suffered harm by being
convicted under the wrong law.
Although her approach could be characterized as giving a convicted
murderer the benefit of a technicality, the case raised for Justice Wilson
the special obligations of the state to treat the accused fairly. She
stressed that it was because of “the Crown’s error that we cannot know for
sure what would have happened to the appellant had she been tried under
the proper law. She should accordingly be given the benefit of any
doubt”.25 The bedrock principle for Justice Wilson was that the individual
was to be given the benefit of the doubt. That said, she attempted to
reconcile her judgment with prior holdings that the Charter could not be
applied retroactively by focusing on the ongoing and contemporary effects
of the 1976 conviction on Janise Gamble’s liberty.
The very next year, Justice Wilson dealt with a case involving
another woman charged with first degree murder, Sharon Turpin. Turpin
24
Richard Pound, Unlucky to the End: The Story of Janise Marie Gamble (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s, 2007).
25
R. v. Gamble, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595, at 647 (S.C.C.).
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and two men were charged with killing her husband. Under the Criminal
Code26 as it applied in Ontario at that time, all accused charged with
murder had to be tried by a judge and jury. Perhaps fearing how a jury
might react to allegations that she arranged to have her husband killed,
Sharon Turpin argued that she should have a right to a judge-alone trial
under the right to a jury trial in section 11(f) of the Charter. She also
argued that she should have a right to a judge-alone trial under the
equality rights in section 15 of the Charter because if she had been tried
in Alberta, she would have had the option of a judge-alone murder trial
under the Code. Justice Wilson ultimately rejected both of Turpin’s
arguments, but her reasoning was consistent with her liberal principles as
well as with her careful attention to the text and purpose of the law.
Although she eventually concluded that section 11(f) of the Charter
did not provide a Charter right to a non-jury trial, much of Justice
Wilson’s judgment focused on whether the accused could waive his or
her Charter right to a jury. She rejected Australian and American
authority and Canadian statutory authority on the basis that “[i]n denying
the individual’s ability to waive his or her right to a jury trial these cases
advance a collective interest in the utilization of a jury in serious criminal
charges”.27 This conclusion accorded with her sense that the purpose of
Charter rights was to protect individuals. Social interests had to be justified
by the state under section 1 of the Charter. She stressed that: “It will be for
the accused and his or her counsel and not for the courts to decide which
course will be in the best interests of the accused in any given case.”28
Justice Wilson had little time for benevolent paternalism. She recognized
that women would chronically be victimized by such paternalism, but the
larger and liberal principle was that all individuals should be able to make
decisions for themselves.
As in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson stressed in Turpin the idea that
rights created a zone of freedom in which each individual was able to
make decisions. This was classical liberalism in the sense that it took
individuals as ends in themselves. Justice Wilson was no doubt keenly
aware that women had been denied the benefits of making judgments
about what was in their own best interests throughout the ages.
Nevertheless, she defended liberal principles as ends in themselves. She
26
27

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”].
R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1320 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Turpin”].
28

Id., at 1322.
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would not impose her own judgments about what was best when any
person was exercising a constitutionally protected freedom.
Justice Wilson’s principles informed her approach to judging, but
they also had to be anchored in the text of the law. She felt comfortable
concluding that an individual could waive Charter rights because they
were intended for the benefit of the individual. At the same time,
however, Charter rights were not a blank slate on which a judge could
write her own principles into the law. Although Sharon Turpin could
waive her right to a jury trial, she could not claim a Charter right to a
non-jury trial because there was “nothing in s. 11(f) to give the
appellants a constitutional right to elect their mode of trial or a
constitutional right to be tried by judge alone so as to make s. 11(f)
inconsistent with the mandatory jury trial provisions of the Criminal
Code”.29 Although it may be fashionable in some quarters to criticize the
Court’s and especially Justice Wilson’s approach to the early interpretation of the Charter as one of judicial activism aided and abetted by
the work of legal academics,30 Justice Wilson was a careful lawyer
guided by the text of the Charter. In Turpin, she concluded that neither
the purpose nor the text of the Charter supported a right to a judge-alone
trial. In the absence of such a Charter right, the provisions of the
Criminal Code requiring trial by jury would prevail even though they
enforced collective interests in jury trials to the detriment of individual
accused such as Sharon Turpin.
Turpin had one more argument to make, and it was based on section
15 of the Charter. She argued that her equality rights were denied
because she would have had the option of a judge-alone trial had she
been tried in Alberta. Justice Wilson concluded that Sharon Turpin had
been denied the equal benefit of the law compared to an accused in
Alberta because she had no choice as to her mode of trial.
A choice as to having or not having a jury trial (even though limited by
the overriding determination by the trial judge), based upon the
advantages of one mode of trial over the other because of a wide range
of factors, such as: the nature and circumstances of the killing, the
amount of publicity, the reaction in the community, the size of the
community from which the jury is being drawn and even the
preference of defence counsel with respect to trying to convince a jury
or a judge of the defence version of the facts (or leave them with a
29
30

Id., at 1330.
See supra, note 18.
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reasonable doubt), indicates that having that choice must be considered
a benefit. The absence of that benefit in Ontario must be considered a
disadvantage.31

In this passage, Justice Wilson recognized that the benefit of the jury
trial could in some circumstances be a disadvantage for the individual
accused, especially a woman accused of hiring someone to kill her
husband. That said, Justice Wilson’s focus was not on the empirical
question of whether an accused could be disadvantaged by a jury trial.
Rather she focused on the fact that Turpin would have had more freedom
if she had been tried in Alberta where judge-alone trials were possible in
murder cases. The principle was liberty and freedom. Freedom for all
individuals would assist women like Sharon Turpin.
The conclusion that Turpin had been denied an equal benefit
extended to similarly situated accused in Alberta, however, did not end
the equality rights analysis. As she had with respect to section 11(f) of
the Charter, Justice Wilson returned to the text of the Charter. The text
of section 15 of the Charter required that the broadly worded equality
rights be denied with discrimination. She stressed that section 15
“mandates a case by case analysis as was undertaken by this Court in
Andrews to determine 1) whether the distinction created by the
impugned legislation results in a violation of one of the equality rights
and, if so, 2) whether that distinction is discriminatory in its purpose or
effect”.32 On the issue of discrimination, she concluded that those
charged with murder outside Alberta “do not constitute a disadvantaged
group in Canadian society within the contemplation of s. 15”.33
Justice Wilson’s conclusion that section 15 was not violated in
Turpin followed from the Court’s landmark decision in Andrews34 to
stress the need for a finding of discriminatory effects or purposes for a
section 15 violation. Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in Andrews,
like her Morgentaler judgment, went to the heart of the matter. Again,
she was not afraid to cite American constitutional law and theory in
support of her conclusions despite the interest at that time in using
socialist and Tory touches as a means to distinguish Canadian political
culture from American political culture.35 In Andrews, she had concluded
31

Turpin, supra, note 27, at 1330.
Id., at 1334.
33
Id., at 1333.
34
Andrews, supra, note 6.
35
See Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1968); Patrick Macklem, “Constitutional Ideologies” (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117.
32
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that non-citizens were an analogous group that should be added to
section 15 because they were vulnerable to discrimination. She cited
both the famous Carolene Products36 footnote 4 and supportive
academic commentary in the United States. She stressed:
that the range of discrete and insular minorities has changed and will
continue to change with changing political and social circumstances.
For example, Stone J. writing in 1938, was concerned with religious,
national and racial minorities. In enumerating the specific grounds in s.
15, the framers of the Charter embraced these concerns in 1982 but
also addressed themselves to the difficulties experienced by the
disadvantaged on the grounds of ethnic origin, colour, sex, age and
physical and mental disability. It can be anticipated that the discrete
and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognized
as such today. It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that
it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the “unremitting
protection” of equality rights in the years to come.37

Justice Wilson’s minority centred approach to section 15 of the Charter
was likely influenced by her feminism. At the same time, her own
experience as an immigrant and newcomer to Canada also likely made
her acutely aware of the difficulties faced by non-citizens and other
outsiders.
Justice Wilson’s approach to section 15 was also influenced by its
text. The broad test that found equality rights were violated whenever
similarly situated persons were not subject to the same treatment did not
fit with the text of section 15 of the Charter, which required that equality
rights be violated with discrimination. She was also concerned that such
an expansive reading of equality rights would have the effect of diluting
the obligations of the state under section 1 of the Charter to justify limits
on Charter rights. Justice Wilson’s concerns about disadvantaged
minorities was an inclusive concern, and it laid the basis for the eventual
recognition of gays and lesbians as a discrete and insular minority in
need of protection from majoritarian politics.
The Court’s more restrained and focused approach to equality rights
in Andrews may seem inevitable today, but it was vigorously contested
at the time it was decided. Many lower courts had emphasized the value
of equal treatment of all, and this was particularly true in the context of
any unequal application of the criminal law. Justice Wilson recognized
36
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that her conclusion in Turpin went against the grain of considerable
lower court authority,38 but she nevertheless concluded that the idea that
the same criminal law should apply throughout Canada did not accord
with either the text or the purpose of section 15 of the Charter. Although
she was well aware of the disadvantages that Sharon Turpin might suffer
as a result of being required to face a jury trial for the alleged murder of
her husband, Justice Wilson concluded that neither the text nor the
purpose of sections 11(f) or 15 of the Charter supported a right to a trial
by judge alone.
Justice Wilson’s most famous procedural decision was her decision
in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)39 that the
refugee determination procedures in immigration law violated section 7
of the Charter because they did not provide the applicant with an oral
hearing. Consistent with liberal principles, she rejected the government’s
claims that the proceedings were non-adversarial. Justice Wilson
stressed that the “greatest concern about the procedural scheme … is not,
therefore, with the absence of an oral hearing in and of itself, but with
the inadequacy of the opportunity the scheme provides for a refugee
claimant to state his case and know the case he has to meet”.40 Although
some refugee applicants may learn of the Minister’s case through a
formal appeal, others may not. In this sense, Justice Wilson was
sensitive to unequal treatment among members of a vulnerable group.
Justice Wilson’s liberalism was also revealed in her rejection in
Singh of any idea that the non-citizen’s interests could be reduced to the
status of a privilege revocable by the state as opposed to a right. She also
rejected the idea that administrative convenience could, as a “utilitarian
consideration”,41 serve as a justification under section 1 of the Charter
for a violation of section 7 rights. She viewed the procedural issue
through the philosophical premises that the interests of the individual
should be understood as rights, while the interests of the state as a
representative of the majority should not overwhelm the rights of the
individual.
Although Justice Wilson stressed the substantive flaws in the
abortion law in Morgentaler,42 she was concerned with the procedural
38
39
40
41
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protections of the individual in many criminal law and immigration law
cases. Her approach was informed by a conviction that the accused
deserved the benefit of the doubt from the state and that individuals
should have the freedom to choose how to exercise their rights.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
Like Brian Dickson, Bertha Wilson never practised criminal law but
was able to make a significant mark on that branch of the law. Justice
Wilson’s classical liberalism found a natural home in her defence of
principles of subjective fault. These principles required the state to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular accused, with all of
his or her idiosyncrasies and frailties, was at fault. As with the
procedural protections examined in the last section, however, Justice
Wilson’s approach was disciplined by attention to the relevant text and
purposes of the law.
Justice Wilson’s fullest defence of the principles of subjective mens
rea came in her decision in R. v. Tutton 43 which dealt with the Criminal
Code’s definition of criminal negligence as showing wanton or reckless
disregard for the life or safety of others. She held that the provision
should be interpreted as requiring some subjective fault because
Parliament had not clearly displaced the common law presumption of
subjective fault. In some respects, Justice Wilson’s decision is mainly of
historical interest because the objective standard would be applied
today.44 That said, however, Justice Wilson’s judgment remains a
powerful defence of principles of subjective fault.
Tutton dealt with a difficult case in which deeply religious parents
believed that their diabetic child had been cured by God and stopped
giving him his prescribed insulin. They were charged with causing their
son’s death by criminal negligence. The Ontario Court of Appeal had
sought to respond to the exigencies of the case by holding that a
subjective standard of fault should be applied to failures to act while the
objective standard should be applied to acts of commission. The
Supreme Court rejected this distinction, but was divided 3-3. Justice
Wilson, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La
Forest, concluded that a subjective standard should apply in all cases of
criminal negligence. Justice McIntyre, with the concurrence of Justice
43
44
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L’Heureux-Dubé, concluded that an objective standard should apply. It
is significant that Justice Wilson and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé disagreed
in this case. Justice Lamer agreed that an objective standard should
apply, but would have used an individuated standard tailored to some of
the personal characteristics of the accused such as the accused’s age and
education. He failed to address whether a person’s religious beliefs were
relevant to administering this modified objective standard.
Justice Wilson argued that Parliament’s definition of criminal
negligence was ambiguous. Although the reference to negligence pointed
in the direction of an objective standard, the reference to wanton and
reckless disregard suggested a need to prove some subjective advertence to
the risk to life or safety. In the face of this ambiguity, she concluded that
the presumption of subjective fault for criminal offences articulated in preCharter cases such as R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City)45 and R. v. Pappajohn46
should apply. Making specific reference to the controversial Pappajohn
defence of a subjective but not necessarily reasonable mistake of fact,
Justice Wilson concluded that: “To require, as does my colleague, that all
misperceptions be reasonable will, in my view, not excuse many of those
who through no fault of their own cannot fairly be expected to live up to
the standard of the reasonable person”.47 Justice Wilson’s invocation of
Pappajohn in 1989 is significant. The decision had attracted sustained
scholarly criticism from feminist scholars since it had been decided. The
critiques focused on the effects of the defence of honest but unreasonable
mistake of fact in sexual assault cases and the focus of the defence on the
perspective of the accused as opposed to the victim.48 In Tutton, however,
Justice Wilson invoked the controversial case for the broader proposition
that subjective standards were best suited to ensuring that all accused were
treated fairly.
Justice Wilson stated that she was “cautiously sympathetic to
attempts to integrate elements of subjective perception into criminal law
standards that are clearly objective”, but she rejected Justice Lamer’s
modified objective approach on the grounds that it would inevitably be
both under and over inclusive when compared to a subjective standard.
She explained:
45
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One problem with attempts to individualize an objective standard is
that regard for the disabilities of the particular accused can only be
applied in a general fashion to alter the objective standard. It seems
preferable to me to continue to address the question of whether a
subjective standard (a standard, I might add, that in its form is applied
equally to all and consistent with individual responsibility) has been
breached in each case than to introduce varying standards of conduct
which will be only roughly related to the presence or absence of
culpability in the individual case. Varying the level of conduct by
factoring in some personal characteristics may be unavoidable if the
court is faced with a clearly objective standard but it should, in my
opinion, be avoided if the more exacting subjective test is available as
a matter of statutory interpretation. I have no doubt that factors such as
the accused’s age and mental development will often be relevant to
determining culpability but under a subjective test they will be relevant
only as they relate to the question of whether the accused was aware of
or wilfully blind to the prohibited risk and will not have to be factored
in wholesale in order to adjust the standard of conduct that is expected
from citizens.49

Although she was a leader in individuating objective standards to
make them fairer to those who might be neglected under a simple
reasonable person standard,50 these statements make clear that an
individuated reasonable person standard was a definite second best to a
fully subjective standard for Justice Wilson. A subjective standard was
the most consistent with “the principles of equality and individual
responsibility which should pervade the criminal law”.51 As Danielle
Pinard has recognized, Justice Wilson’s attraction to subjective mens rea
was related to her concern for the dignity of individuals on their own
terms.52
Justice Wilson’s commitment to fault principles was also well
demonstrated in two decisions dealing with a provision that made it an
offence subject to life imprisonment for a man to have sex with a girl
under 14 years of age. She approached this issue not from the
perspective of either the girl’s wishes or her need for protection from the
risks of sexual intercourse, but rather from the perspective of whether it
49
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was fair to impose the criminal sanction without proof of fault. Justice
Wilson concluded that the no-fault offence violated section 7 of the
Charter because it did not respect the dignity of the accused and treated
him as a means for the achievement of social objectives:
Our commitment to the principle that those who did not intend to
commit harm and who took all reasonable precautions to ensure that
they did not commit an offence should not be imprisoned stems from
an acute awareness that to imprison a “mentally innocent” person is to
inflict a grave injury on that person’s dignity and sense of worth.
Where that person’s beliefs and his actions leading up to the
commission of the prohibited act are treated as completely irrelevant in
the face of the state’s pronouncement that he must automatically be
incarcerated for having done the prohibited act, that person is treated as
little more than a means to an end. That person is in essence told that
because of an overriding social or moral objective he must lose his
freedom even although he took all reasonable precautions to ensure
that no offence was committed.53

In this passage, Justice Wilson suggests that principles of fault are
necessary to treat accused persons as ends in themselves and not as
instruments in the deterrence of harmful conduct. As in Morgentaler, her
approach suggested the need for the law to respect how the individual
exercised his capacity to reason and to make choices.
Consistent with her concern for the exceptional case as exemplified
by a focus on subjective fault, Justice Wilson posited a case in which the
accused genuinely believed that the girl was over 14 years of age. In
addition, she cast doubt on the idea that deterrence concerns could
justify a no-fault offence under section 1 when she argued that
“punishing the mentally innocent with a view to advancing particular
objectives is fundamentally unfair. It is to use the innocent as a means to
an end. While utilitarian reasoning may at one time have been
acceptable, it is my view that when we are dealing with the potential for
life imprisonment it has no place in a free and democratic society”.54
Although Justice Wilson may have been willing to accept the use of
objective liability standards in this particular context, much of the logic
of both her insistence on the proof of fault under section 7 of the Charter
and her rejection of deterrence under section 1 was rooted in her concern
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about the need to respect the individual as a person who can make
autonomous choices and is worthy of respect.
Justice Wilson’s approach stands in contrast to that of Justice
McLachlin, the third woman appointed to the Court, who dissented and
held that the section 7 violation was justified as a reasonable limit under
section 1 of the Charter that was necessary to deter sexual activity with
girls under 14 years of age. Justice McLachlin stressed that there was a
limit to how much older a girl was and the minimum costs for the
accused of ascertaining the girl’s true age or desisting from sexual
intercourse. She also suggested that the “lack of culpability” of an
accused who did not know that the girl was under 14 years of age could
be reflected in a diminished sentence because the statutory rape offence,
while punishable by life imprisonment, did not have any mandatory
minimum penalty. Justice Wilson responded to this last argument
bluntly:
Justice McLachlin recognizes that there is something troubling about
subjecting someone who has made a genuine mistake of fact to life
imprisonment. She feels that mental innocence may be taken into
account when sentencing the accused. … this serves to highlight the
weaknesses of arguments upholding the linking of life imprisonment to
an absolute liability offence. … one cannot leave questions of mental
innocence to the sentencing process. … Reliance on prosecutorial or
judicial discretion to mitigate the harshness of an unjust law will
provide little comfort to the mentally innocent and cannot, in my view,
serve to justify a fundamentally unsound provision.55

Justice Wilson rejected the idea that the prospect of benevolent
prosecutorial or judicial discretion could save a law that violated the
rights of a mentally innocent person not to be convicted of a criminal
offence.
There was also an intriguing difference of opinion between Justice
Wilson and Justice McLachlin over the issue of equality. Justice Wilson
rejected the accused’s argument that the offence violated section 15 of
the Charter because it only applied to males. In contrast, Justice
McLachlin took a more formal approach to equality which accepted that
the male-only offence violated section 15 of the Charter but then held
that the violation was justified under section 1 of the Charter. Justice
Wilson stressed that section 15 should accommodate the biological
reality that only females can become pregnant. Formal equality was just
55
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not realistic when pregnancy was in issue. Justice Wilson’s conclusion
that section 15 was not violated was also consistent with the idea that she
has expressed in Andrews and Turpin that equality rights protected only
groups vulnerable to discrimination and that men did not constitute such
a group.
Men may not, for Justice Wilson, have merited protection under
section 15, but this was no excuse for not protecting their rights under
section 7 of the Charter. She stressed that men accused of statutory rape
were entitled to the same degree of protection under section 7 as all
accused. She concluded that “one could not seek to justify the
infringement of section 7 by pointing to the accused’s sex and by saying
that because he is a man he is not entitled to the full protection of s. 7. It
is no more open to the government to make this argument than it would
be open to it to suggest that a woman procuring an abortion was not
entitled to the full protection of s. 7 because she was a woman.”56 These
statements were made at a time in the early 1990s when concern about
sexual violence was at a very high level. Some serious consideration was
given to the use of the override the next year when the Supreme Court
struck down a “rape shield” restriction on the admissibility of a
complainant’s prior sexual activity in sexual assault cases.57 The
statements were also made before DNA exonerations indicated that some
men had been wrongly convicted of sexual assault. Justice Wilson took a
strong and, in progressive circles, unpopular stance on the importance of
the section 7 rights of those accused of sexual assault because she was
committed to liberal principles that required the state to respect the rights
of all accused people.
Justice Wilson’s defence of the principles of subjective fault was not
absolute or unqualified. As discussed above, she seemed to accept that
objective fault principles could be used in the statutory rape context.
Moreover, she recognized in Tutton that Parliament was entitled to
displace subjective fault standards if it did so clearly. Even when
Parliament clearly imposed standards of reasonableness with respect to
the defences of provocation and self-defence, however, Justice Wilson
would attempt to apply those objective standards in a manner that was
sensitive to the different circumstances that different individuals found
56
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themselves in. To be sure, she did not convert objective standards to
subjective standards. Justice Wilson paid too much attention to the text
and purpose of the law to undertake such a crude strategy. Nevertheless,
she did move objective standards in the direction of subjective standards.
This approach was consistent with her concern about protecting all
individuals from the state.
One of Justice Wilson’s most sophisticated judgments was her
dissent in R. v. Hill.58 The case involved a claim by a 16-year-old that he
was provoked when his adult “Big Brother” made sexual advances to
him. The judge instructed the jury to consider whether an ordinary
person would have lost self-control in the circumstances without
reference to the accused’s age or gender. Chief Justice Dickson
dismissed the accused’s appeal from a murder conviction for the
majority of the Court. He reasoned that the jury could be trusted to apply
the appropriate ordinary person standard. Justice Wilson dissented and
would have overturned Hill’s murder conviction and ordered a new trial.
Justice Wilson related the text of the provocation defence with its
reference to an ordinary person with its purpose which she saw as being
to require uniform standards of self-control. She reasoned:
The objective standard … may be said to exist in order to ensure that in
the evaluation of the provocation defence there is no fluctuating
standard of self-control against which accuseds are measured. The
governing principles are those of equality and individual responsibility,
so that all persons are held to the same standard notwithstanding their
distinctive personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the
standard. The success of a provocation defence rests on establishing
the accused’s act as one which any ordinary person might have done in
the circumstances and not upon eliciting the court’s compassion for an
accused whose act was unjustified but who could not control himself in
the way expected of an ordinary person. It is evident that any deviation
from this objective standard against which an accused’s level of
self-control is measured necessarily introduces an element of
inequality in the way in which the actions of different persons are
evaluated and must therefore be avoided if the underlying principle
that all persons are equally responsible for their actions is to be
maintained.59
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The only exception to the universalism of the objective standard was for
the age of the accused. The law had long recognized that the same
standards of self-control could not be expected of young persons as
adults. Other personal characteristics such as gender or race should not
be considered in determining the appropriate level of self-control. Unlike
Chief Justice Dickson, Justice Wilson would not rely on the common
sense of the jury to ensure that the correct standard was applied. Age
was for her the only factor that justified lowering the level of self-control
that the objective standard demanded of all persons.
Justice Wilson concluded that Hill’s gender was, however, relevant
in placing the act or insult into context. She reasoned that such a use of
personal characteristic does not “undermine the objective standard
because it is done purely for the purpose of putting the insult into context
and assessing its gravity”; in her view, “[t]he objective standard and its
underlying principles of equality and individual responsibility are not …
undermined when” factors such as gender or race “are taken into account
only for the purpose of putting the provocative insult into context”.60
Although this approach to placing the insult in context runs the risk of
incorporating irrational and excessive responses to homosexual
advances, it would still be disciplined by the refusal to factor Hill’s
gender into the level of self-control required by the objective standard.
In other words, the issue for Justice Wilson was how an ordinary person
would respond to homosexual advances and not how an ordinary man
would respond to them.
The ordinary person is of course an artificial construct, but it would
for Justice Wilson include both men and women. The excessively violent
responses of some men to homosexual advances would be balanced off
by the non-violent responses of some women to homosexual advances.
Justice Wilson refused to incorporate understandings of masculinity that
would promote a lack of self-control or an inclination to violence. All
people were bound by equal standards of conduct that made them
responsible for their actions, but in some cases, the trier of fact could not
understand the full meaning of the act or insult without considering
personal characteristics that were relevant to the specific act or insult. In
the case of a homosexual advance, the accused’s gender required
consideration even though it should not affect the level of self-control
demanded by the law.

60
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Justice Wilson’s careful approach in Hill to how and when the
accused’s personal characteristics would be relevant when applying
objective standards of conduct has unfortunately not won the day. Both
the approach taken by Chief Justice Dickson for the majority of the
Court in Hill and that taken by the majority of the Court in the
subsequent R. v. Thibert61 case run the risk that personal characteristics
other than age will erode the level of self-control expected of the
accused. In particular, they invite consideration of how an ordinary man
would react to the break-up of a relationship or to sexual advances by
another man. The Court’s open-ended approach on these issues runs the
real risk that violent images of masculinity will undermine objective
standards of self-control. The Court’s undisciplined approach to the
provocation defence has raised concerns that it will excuse unacceptable
violence and that the courts have effectively eroded the purposes of the
ordinary person standard.62 Although Justice Wilson had a preference for
subjective standards of fault, she took Parliament’s use of objective
standards seriously.63 Moreover, she attempted to factor in personal
characteristics of the accused in a principled manner that was consistent
with the text and purpose of the objective standard in the provocation
defence.
Justice Wilson’s best-known attempt to have objective standards
reflect the personal characteristics of the accused was her landmark
decision in the self-defence case of R. v. Lavallee.64 Lavallee dealt with
whether expert evidence of battered woman’s syndrome was admissible
in a case in which a battered woman shot her spouse in the back of the
head after the spouse had threatened her. The Court held that the expert
evidence was admissible and affirmed the jury’s acquittal. Nevertheless,
it would be a mistake to conclude that Justice Wilson’s judgment tied
self-defence to whether or not a woman manifested battered woman’s
syndrome. Indeed, she specifically warned that “the fact that the
appellant was a battered woman does not entitle her to an acquittal.
61
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Battered women may well kill their partners other than in self-defence.
The focus is not on who the woman is, but on what she did …
Ultimately it is up to the jury to decide whether, in fact, the accused’s
perceptions and actions were reasonable.”65 Justice Wilson was too much
of a liberal individualist, not to mention a careful judge, to ever delegate
the question of whether a person acted in self-defence to the diagnostic
decisions made by health care professionals. Past battering should not be
ignored, but the ultimate question was whether the accused’s actions
were reasonably justified.
Justice Wilson recognized the legitimacy of Parliament’s decision to
require that the accused not only subjectively apprehend death or
grievous bodily harm and subjectively believe that violent self-defence
was necessary for self-preservation, but also that there be a reasonable
basis for such beliefs. She did not convert self-defence into a subjective
defence, even though her judgment in Tutton suggests that she believed
that a subjective approach was best suited to ensuring that all accused in
all their particularities were treated fairly. Nevertheless, she attempted to
adapt Parliament’s clearly articulated objective standards to the
particular context of battered women.
In determining whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension
of death or grievous bodily harm, Justice Wilson rejected the idea66 that
an assault would have to be underway or imminent for the accused to
have a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm. She
stressed that section 34(2) of the Criminal Code did not on its terms
require an imminent attack. As discussed above, Justice Wilson took the
text of the law seriously and she was concerned that the lower courts had
read in restrictions to the defence that were not contemplated in the text
that Parliament had enacted.
An additional issue in Lavallee was whether the accused believed on
reasonable grounds that she could not otherwise preserve herself from
death or grievous bodily harm. This part of the self-defence test was the
most challenging because it engaged the standard of reasonable conduct
with respect to the use of violence that is expected of all persons. As
discussed above, Justice Wilson had taken a fairly hard line on this issue
in Hill by concluding that youth was the only personal characteristic that
was relevant to the standard of self-control. At first reading, then, it
might be concluded that her approach in Lavallee was at odds with her
65
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approach four years earlier in Hill because she concluded in Lavallee
that the gender and experience of the accused could be relevant to
determining whether the accused had acted reasonably in killing her
partner.
Justice Wilson’s decision in Lavallee can, however, be reconciled
with her judgment in Hill. In Lavallee, evidence about the accused’s
characteristics and circumstances and the experiences of battered women
would be used not to suggest that women were subject to lesser
standards of self-control than men, but rather to compensate for a
number of disadvantages that only women would experience in a selfdefence scenario. Justice Wilson was concerned that judges and juries
might reject a battered woman’s self-defence claim on the unrealistic
basis that the woman always had the alternative of leaving the abusive
relationship as opposed to resorting to violent self-help. Justice Wilson
addressed this danger directly and concluded that “it is not for the jury to
pass judgment on the fact that an accused battered woman stayed in the
relationship. Still less is it entitled to conclude that she forfeited her right
to self-defence for having done so.”67 Gender was not to be considered in
order to hold women to lower standards of self-control, but rather to
ensure that the circumstances of battered women were fairly considered
and evaluated by the trier of fact.
Although Lavallee created a new contextualized approach to selfdefence, Justice Wilson also attempted to justify her new approach by
adapting traditional concepts of self-defence to the circumstances of
battered women. To this end, she argued “that traditional self-defence
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home instead of
defending herself. … A man’s home may be his castle but it is also the
woman’s home even if it seems to her more like a prison in the circumstances.”68 This statement is based on the premise that the standard
of self-control traditionally expected of people by the law of self-defence
did not require retreat. Justice Wilson was prepared to accept a fairly
generous ambit for self-defence for all individuals and this made it easier
for her to expand the ambit of self-defence in Lavallee. She would have
agreed with a subsequent decision that stressed that it was the accused
who deserved the benefit of the doubt in self-defence cases.69
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A careful reading of Lavallee suggests that many of the criticisms
that it has received from both feminists and those skeptical of battered
women syndrome are unfair. A number of feminist commentators and
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R. v. Malott70 have raised concerns that a
focus on battered women’s syndrome might medicalize self-defence for
battered women and make it difficult for battered women who do not fit
into psychological profiles of a battered woman to claim the defence.
These criticisms are in my view allayed by Justice Wilson’s focus on the
individual accused. The corollary of her warning that not all battered
women will necessarily act in self-defence is the proposition that women
may act in self-defence even if they are not diagnosed as battered
women. To be sure, there may be problems of convincing juries to
accept a defence in the absence of expert evidence, but from a doctrinal
perspective, Justice Wilson’s approach was very much focused on the
individual.
Others have criticized Lavallee as based on junk science and
advocacy for women.71 Although the science behind battered women’s
syndrome can indeed be questioned, it is unfair to characterize Lavallee
as ignoring the text and purpose of section 34(2) of the Code or as
mandating the acquittal of all women who are diagnosed as having
battered women’s syndrome. Justice Wilson made quite clear that not all
battered women will act in self-defence. At the end of the day, the trier
of fact must be convinced not only that the accused believed that
violence was the only way to avoid more battering, but also that this
belief was reasonable. As in all her criminal law decisions, Justice
Wilson focused on the individual accused and the need to give that
individual any benefit of the doubt about guilt.

V. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE JUSTIFY
INVASIONS OF LIBERTY
The Supreme Court has had second thoughts about the rigorous
Oakes72 standard for justifying limits on rights from the start. In the same
year as he penned Oakes with its insistence that the state take the least
70
[1998] S.C.J. No. 12, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123 (S.C.C.) and authors cited at para. 39. Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé did, however, recognize that Wilson J. also considered environmental as well as
mental factors that may have influenced a woman’s decision not to leave a battering relationship.
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David Paciocco, Getting Away with Murder (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999), at 306.
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drastic possible approach to limiting Charter rights, Justice Dickson also
authored R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,73 which stressed the need to
defer to reasonable attempts by the legislature to balance conflicting
interests and accommodate rights in its legislative program.
The issue in Edwards Books was an exemption in a provincial
Sunday closing law that allowed businesses with no more than seven
employees that closed for religious reasons on a business day to be open
on Sunday as a form of reasonable accommodation. Justice Dickson
concluded for the majority of the Court that the state had acted
reasonably even though its exemption would not apply to larger stores
that closed for religious reasons on a Saturday. He stressed the secular
legislative purpose of the Sunday closing law in providing for a common
result day.
Justice Wilson dissented on the basis that the state had failed to
demonstrate why it could not accommodate all businesses that closed for
religious reasons on days other than Sunday. She characterized the
legislature’s line drawing as unprincipled and productive of a
“checkerboard”74 approach to rights. Freedom of religion should, in her
view, protect “the rights of all members of the group. It does not make
fish of some and fowl of the others. For, quite apart from considerations
of equality, to do so is to introduce an invidious distinction into the
group and sever the religious and cultural tie that binds them together.”75
As in Singh,76 Justice Wilson was not satisfied with arguments that some
members of a minority would be treated fairly. Everyone in the group
should be treated fairly. This was a liberal’s insistence that each and
every individual be treated fairly.
Justice Wilson was also concerned that the government had failed to
discharge its burden of justifying the infringement of the right to
freedom of religion. She stressed that the “Crown adduced no evidence
to establish that permitting all retailers who close on Saturdays on
religious grounds to stay open on Sundays would cause a substantial
disruption of the common pause day”.77 In her remaining years on the
Court, Justice Wilson was a fierce defender of a rigorous version of the
Oakes test. Her stubborn consistency on the question of justification was
73
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based on liberal principles that stressed the need to protect the individual
from the state and to restrain state activity that harmed the rights of
individuals.
Justice Wilson parted company with Chief Justice Dickson again in
a series of cases involving prostitution laws. The main decision involved
a broad 1985 law that was enacted against all forms of public solicitation
for the purpose of prostitution. Justice Dickson accepted that the law was
a reasonable response to the public nuisance of solicitation. Justice
Wilson, with the concurrence of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, dissented on
the basis that the law was overbroad and would apply to expression that
would not produce any public nuisance.78 The dissent was based on
standard overbreadth analysis rather than a feminist critique of laws
against street prostitution. Justice Lamer was the only judge to discuss
feminist writings in his judgment. He believed that they supported his
conclusion that the law should be upheld as an attempt to protect street
prostitutes as a disadvantaged group. Justice Wilson may have had
concerns about the disadvantaging effects of prostitution laws on
women, but she was most comfortable with an analysis that stressed the
importance of the individual’s freedom of expression and association
and the state’s overbreadth in responding to public nuisances.
Justice Wilson parted company with Justice Lamer again in 1990 on
the question of whether the reverse onus placed on the accused to
establish the insanity defence could be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. Justice Lamer, for the majority of the Court, was influenced by
the traditional nature of the reverse onus and the possible dangers of
acquitting people whenever there was a reasonable doubt about their
insanity. Justice Wilson in her dissent stressed the need to focus on the
criminal context of the case. She explained:
In my view, this is not a situation calling for a departure from the strict
standard of review set forth in Oakes. On the contrary, the issue on
appeal seems to be the quintessential case of the state acting as the
“singular antagonist” of a very basic legal right of the accused rather
than in the role of “mediating between different groups” as discussed
in Irwin Toy. This is, in my view, an appropriate case in which to
apply the stricter standard of review on the “minimal impairment”
issue.79
78
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She also concluded that the American experience with the less
restrictive alternative of only placing an evidential burden on the accused
demonstrated that the government had not justified the traditional
reverse onus as the least rights restrictive means to control the insanity
defence. She parted company with Justice Lamer the next year in Swain80
when she concluded that allowing the Crown to raise the insanity
defence when the accused put his or her state of mind in issue could not
be justified under section 1 as a reasonable limitation on the accused’s
right to control his or her own defence. Again, she stressed that the state
was acting as “the singular antagonist” of the accused and that there was
“no room for deference to the legislature” when the courts themselves
were reformulating a common law rule to make it consistent with the
Charter.
Justice Wilson was again in lonely dissent when she found that the
government had not justified mandatory retirement at 65 years of age.
Although this case arose outside of the criminal context and in the
context of universities, Justice Wilson still focused more on the effects
of mandatory retirement laws on individuals than she did on the
government’s attempt to mediate between the claims of competing
generations. She rejected the idea that mandatory retirement was
necessary to do justice to “younger academics”. In her view, the
government had created a conflict between younger and older academics
by starving the universities for cash. Despite recognizing that the Court
had sanctioned some departures from the strict Oakes requirement, she
remained uncomfortable with the trend:
This Court has stressed that the standard which presumptively applies
is that of Oakes. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the full
rigours of Oakes should be ameliorated. The onus in this case was on
the respondent universities to show that the application of a more
relaxed test under s. 1 was appropriate. In my respectful view that onus
has not been met.81

Justice Wilson also stressed that the universities could make room
for young academics by offering incentives to older professors to take
voluntary retirement as opposed to forcing all older professors to retire.
She was offended by the notion that individuals were being forced to
retire. She also rejected the idea that mandatory retirement was a
80
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package deal that was tied to pensions and other benefits. With the same
insistence as in Edwards Books that the rights of everyone affected be
considered, she noted that non-unionized employees and those who
joined the workforce late (mostly women) would be severely affected by
mandatory retirement. A concern about the rights of all individuals made
her focus on the rights of the most vulnerable.
One decision that stands in contrast to the above dissents was Justice
Wilson’s decision to join with Chief Justice Dickson, L’Heureux-Dubé
and Gonthier in R. v. Keegstra82 to uphold the hate propaganda offence as
a reasonable limit on freedom of expression and the presumption of
innocence. Justice McLachlin’s dissent which would have struck down the
offence appears to be more consistent with Justice Wilson’s approach to
section 1 than Chief Justice Dickson’s majority decision holding the
government had justified the limits on freedom of expression and the
presumption of innocence. The majority’s decision in Keegstra has been
cited by some of evidence of the Court’s tendency to follow the lead of a
Court party of post-materialistic elites, in this case a range of equalityseeking groups that intervened in support of the hate propaganda law.83
There may indeed be some inconsistency between Justice Wilson’s
general approach to section 1 and her concurrence with Chief Justice
Dickson in Keegstra. That said, a case for the consistency of Justice
Wilson’s position can be made on the basis that the majority in Keegstra
was concerned that the very conditions of liberalism that allow each
individual the maximum liberty and opportunity to pursue his or her life
goals would be thwarted in a world where those who promoted hate
against identifiable groups were given the benefit of any reasonable
doubt. To this extent, Justice Wilson may have concluded that hate
speech presented a sui generis threat to liberalism that was not present in
other section 1 cases discussed above where she found that the state had
failed to justify the necessity of limiting Charter rights. In any event, the
Court as an institution remained ambivalent about the deference to the
state that it displayed in Keegstra. Two years later, Justice McLachlin
82
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found herself in a majority striking down the false news offence in R. v.
Zundel84 on the basis that the state had not justified an overbroad
restriction on freedom of expression.
Unfortunately, by this time Justice Wilson had retired from the
Court. We will never know for certain how she would have decided that
case. I suspect, however, that Justice Wilson would have agreed with
Justice McLachlin and struck down the false news provision as an
overbroad restriction on freedom of expression. Had she remained on the
Court a few more years, Justice Wilson might also have changed the
result in cases such as R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.85 and R. v.
Creighton86 by perhaps siding with Justice Lamer in his dissents in those
cases. Canadian criminal law might look quite different today had
Justice Wilson remained on the bench until she reached the mandatory
retirement age of 75.

VI. CONCLUSION
There is no point in speculating about historical might-have-beens.
There is, however, a point in better understanding the underlying
philosophy that motivated the many important decisions made by Justice
Bertha Wilson during her distinguished service on the Supreme Court.
Although Justice Wilson will understandably be remembered as the first
woman who served on the Supreme Court, it has been suggested in this
essay that her most distinctive and important contribution to the work of
the Supreme Court at a critical time in its history was her steadfast
commitment to the principles of classical liberalism that protected
individuals in all their individuality from the state.
Justice Wilson was aware of the many disadvantages faced by
women, but she consistently favoured liberal strategies that, by protecting
the rights and freedoms of all individuals, would often have an
ameliorating effect on the conditions of women. In the statutory rape case
of Hess, she was not persuaded by strong arguments that maximizing the
liberty of the individual accused in relation to the state would have
disadvantaging effects on women. Her defence of a woman’s right to
choose in Morgentaler87 was grounded in a consistent application of
84
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liberal principles that defended the rights and freedoms of all individuals
from the state. The decision benefited women, but it was grounded in a
consistent and principled stance that defended the rights of all individuals
from the state.
The animating principle in Justice Wilson’s celebrated concurrence
in Morgentaler and in her criminal law and Charter jurisprudence was an
abiding concern about protecting the individual from the state. The
insight about the primacy of Justice Wilson’s classical liberalism and
individualism is important in understanding her outstanding but frequently dissenting contribution to Canadian jurisprudence. It may also
be helpful in understanding the future. There seem to be few judges
today who are as committed to the principles of subjective fault and
strict justification of any limits on rights as Justice Wilson. Today,
context is everything. The liberal principles that Justice Wilson espoused
are often tempered, if not diluted.
It is unfortunate that so few judges today are prepared to follow in
Justice Wilson’s footsteps. Liberalism that defends the right of the
individual against the power of the state and the collectivity is somewhat
out of favour in a post-September 11 world that is preoccupied with the
fear of crime and terrorism. Justice Wilson’s insistence on strict
justification under section 1 of the Charter has been overtaken by a
contextualism that at times seems devoid of principle or predictability.
Justice Wilson’s preference for subjective fault in the criminal law is
under siege as the state continues to expand the criminal sanction and
make increasing use of negligence-based forms of criminal liability. The
Supreme Court has seemingly abandoned the project of constitutionalizing
subjective fault even for serious crimes. The presumption of innocence
that is designed to give the individual accused the benefit of the doubt is
today more honoured in its breach, or at least through a section 1
justification. Justice Wilson’s retirement from the Court and now her
death will prevent us from seeing the present through her eyes. This is a
matter of great regret because she served as a principled conscience for
liberal values that are an important part of our heritage.

